John R. Bolton--Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Excerpts from Mr. Bolton's statement to the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Human Rights and International Organizations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 25, 1992.
Expansion of U.N. Peacekeeping
The last two years have seen an explosion in U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Since last April alone, the Security Council has created new peacekeeping missions in the Persian Gulf, the Western Sahara, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia. Indeed, the last four years have seen the creation of more new U.N. peacekeeping operations than had been undertaken in the previous forty-three years of the organization's history.
Why has U.N. involvement in peacekeeping expanded so rapidly? The simplest answer is because the world has changed so much. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union has led to breathtaking changes in the relations among countries and among peoples, most of which have been for the good. They have not only brought freedom to millions of individuals who lived under the yoke of tyranny but will also lead to greater global prosperity and stability. Some changes have, however, been pernicious and have led to the open expression of long pent-up hatreds. In varying degrees, these regional conflicts damage U.S. interests and impact on our national security.
Overall, these changes in the world order have tremendously increased the importance of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role. With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is finally able to carry out the chief duty entrusted to it by the founders of the United Nations--the preservation of international peace and security. No longer do animosities between the Soviet Union and the Western members prevent the council from taking action to resolve threats to the global peace.
Now, the members of the council work together effectively to address international problems which would have been allowed to fester a few short years ago. In case after case, the Security Council finds solutions to problems which once seemed intractable. Those solutions are frequently imperfect, and they always cost money. They do, however, usually prevent the expansion of conflict, have saved countless thousands of lives, and cost much less than direct U.S. involvement.
The end of the Cold War has not only made the Security Council a more effective institution for addressing threats to international peace, it has also meant that regional conflicts which were fueled by superpower rivalry are now ripe for resolution. In countries as diverse as Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia, communist governments and guerrilla movements have realized that they can no longer count on outside support and must make peace. Given the long history of animosity, people in such countries naturally look for an impartial arbiter as they try to make the transition to a system incorporating all sectors of society. In many cases, the United Nations becomes that arbiter.
As I have mentioned above, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, coupled with rapid democratization throughout the Third World, has had some undesirable side effects. Religious and ethnic animosities long crushed under the dictator's boot heel are now coming to the fore. Yugoslavia has already fallen apart because of such tensions; unrest is also palpable in various portions of the former Soviet Union. In some cases, the world community will be forced to turn to the United Nations to try to help cool things down.
New U.N. peacekeeping activities confront daunting obstacles to fulfilling their mandates. Each individual case presents unique logistical, financial, and underlying political problems. For example:
Cambodia. In Cambodia, the United Nations is beginning to implement its most ambitious peacekeeping effort to date--UNTAC [U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia]. Issues of immediate importance include establishing as soon as possible a viable, nationwide U.N. presence, initiating priority de-mining and infrastructural improvements essential for timely repatriation; preparing to demobilize as many of the factional forces [as] possible (at least 70 percent); and, finally, creating the conditions for free and fair elections. No less important is identifying sources to fund U.N. activities, especially an urgent need for accommodation, transportation, communication, and other support equipment and services.
Yugoslavia. On February 21, 1992, the Security Council established a U.N. Protection Force for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). U.N. estimates project a force of around 14,000 at a cost of close to $640 million the first year. Security Council members have expressed concern over the high costs on UNPROFOR and authorized the dispatch to Yugoslavia of an advance mission to, inter alia, look at ways of reducing costs and creating the conditions necessary for UNPROFOR's full deployment. UNPROFOR will be charged with demilitarizing the three UN-protected areas within Croatia and overseeing the civil and police administration of those areas.
El Salvador. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created May 20, 1991. ONUSAL's original mandate was to verify compliance with the San Jose agreement on human rights. The Security Council expanded ONUSAL January 14, 1992, to include separate peacekeeping (military) and police contingents. There have been accusations on the part of the Government of El Salvador that the FMLN [Farabundo Marti Liberation Front] has violated provisions of the peace agreement on declaring its arms inventories, land seizures, and prompt entry into the zones of concentration. On the other hand, FMLN charges the government with trying to retain former paramilitary police units that it promised to disband. We are looking into allegations by both parties and are working closely with ONUSAL to ensure that the process not lose momentum.
ONUSAL was able to deploy rapidly because its human rights unit had been in El Salvador since mid-1991 and because it inherited all resources, including military officers and equipment, belonging to the U.N. Observer Mission in Central America (ONUCA), which was dissolved shortly after ONUSAL/PK's [Peacekeeping] creation. ONUSAL has had problems, however, in recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified police officers.
Western Sahara. Although 185 U.N. cease-fire monitors deployed in the Western Sahara September 6, 1991, to observe the cease-fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO [Popular Liberation Front for Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra], the formal deployment of the MINURSO [U.N. Mission in Western Sahara] peacekeeping contingent to conduct a referendum has been delayed because of the inability of the two parties to agree on the criteria to be used in selecting voters. The Secretary General has asked that the Security Council grant him until the end of May to resolve all outstanding impediments to the deployment of MINURSO.
Somalia. The Security Council approved last week the dispatch of a technical team to Somalia to discuss with all the warring factions the modalities of providing U.N. cease-fire observers and the effective distribution of humanitarian relief. The technical team must deal with the fact that there are many more opposing factions in Somalia than the two Mogadishu-based ones with which the United Nations has heretofore dealt. The team must also confront the fact that there has not yet been a respected cease-fire despite numerous agreements brokered either through regional or U.N. efforts. To be effective, U.N. peacekeepers in Somalia will have to oversee a continuing political process whose goal will be not only a cease-fire but a resolution of the fundamental political differences among the warring factions that will allow, in the first instance, the successful distribution of badly needed relief assistance.
Peacekeeping Costs
Strong support of U.N. peacekeeping activities has long been a basic tenet of U.S. foreign policy. We must ensure the United Nations has the wherewithal to accomplish its very important mandate. The lack of adequate and timely financing for new and existing peacekeeping operations will pose serious problems for the United Nations and for the U.S. leadership and influence in the United Nations.
We have requested an FY 1992 budget amendment totalling $350 million in the foreign assistance bill to meet FY 1991 and 1992 unfunded requirements for the U.N. Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the U.N. Mission to the Western Sahara, and the U.N. Advance Mission to Cambodia (UNAMIC). Also included in this request is the initial funding for the U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and the U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia.
For FY 1993, the Administration has asked for $350 million to meet new and anticipated peacekeeping requirements. This money will be used to fund U.N. peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Yugoslavia, as well as continue the U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvadore.
Benefits to the United States
We are keenly aware that our current appropriations request for U.S. contributions for international peacekeeping activities represents a very large increase over our previous years' requests. However, while the costs are expanding rapidly, U.N. peacekeeping remains one of the best bargains there is with respect to the maintenance of world peace. Obviously, the amounts which the world spends on U.N. peacekeeping are only the minutest fraction of what the world spends on armaments.
U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. national security interests. Peacekeeping helps prevent regional conflicts from expanding and directly threatening U.S. interests.
Admittedly, not all of these trouble spots would appear to be of direct interest to the United States. Many, however, are areas where U.S. lives, money, and prestige have been on the line for years. In those instances, we appear to be making the last payment on investments which have succeeded brilliantly; failure to pay that last installment could, however, jeopardize the entire investment.
For example, our $20 million bill for U.N. peacekeeping in El Salvador looks high at first--until one compares it with the billions of dollars we have spent ensuring that that nation got to the point where U.N. peacekeeping could succeed. Similarly, the scores of millions of dollars we spent to ensure that a Marxist government did not stifle the will of the people of Angola more than offset the money we are asked to spend to ensure that the United Nations can help demobilize the rival armies and hold fair elections. Finally, who in good conscience could walk away from the last, best chance to resolve the tragedy of Cambodia, a tragedy with which the American people have been linked for years? The United Nations is the best insurance against a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.
Even those U.N. peacekeeping missions with which our ties are less obvious usually directly benefit U.S. interests. For example, in many fields--investment, trade, strategic interests--our links to Yugoslavia are tenuous. Continuation of the war there, however, would have a direct, negative effect on many important U.S. interests in the area. To take one obvious example, the flow of large numbers of refugees could well have undermined the new, fragile democracies on Yugoslavia's northern and eastern borders.
Keeping Costs Down
While I continue to believe U.S. peacekeeping is a tremendous bargain, I am also painfully aware of the need to keep costs down. Our own domestic concerns demand it; so does the credibility of the United Nations.
How can we keep the cost of U.N. peacekeeping down? One way is to create as few new missions as absolutely necessary. The U.N. Charter makes it clear that regional organizations should take the lead in trying to solve regional problems; we fully support this approach.
Let me assure you that we do not view U.N. peacekeeping as the savior of lost causes, to be thrown into a crisis willy-nilly when all else fails. If new peacekeeping missions must be created, they must have as clearly defined a mandate as possible. Preferably, the duration of a new mission should be set in concrete and tied to a process which will clearly lead to a resolution of the underlying problem. The current U.N. peacekeeping missions in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia and the one successfully concluded in Namibia all share these characteristics.
Even if the duration of a peacekeeping mission cannot be so sharply defined, we must make it clear to all parties that U.N. peacekeeping is not an end in itself; U.N. peacekeepers will not serve as the perpetual guarantors of an armed truce. For example, the Security Council resolution authorizing peacekeeping in Yugoslavia specifically tied the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the attempts to negotiate a resolution to the crisis at the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia. We expect those talks to succeed; if they do not, however, and if the parties abandon good faith efforts to resolve their differences, the Security Council will have to reexamine the mandate of that mission.
Another way to keep costs down is to ensure that each individual mission is as lean and efficient as possible. We are in constant communication with the U.N. Secretariat to make certain that the number of peacekeepers deployed in each mission is the absolute minimum need to implement that mission's mandate. We also press the Secretariat to maximize voluntary contributions from the countries hosting peacekeeping missions and from countries with particular interests in the success of a given mission. These approaches have resulted in the savings of hundreds of millions of dollars from the estimates initially advanced by the United Nations for peacekeeping missions in Namibia and Angola. We expect that they will lead to even greater savings with respect to the upcoming missions in Cambodia and Yugoslavia.
Finally, let me assure you that we are examining the question of whether there is any honorable and equitable way to adjust the percentage that we pay of U.N. peacekeeping costs. We cannot escape the fact that our economy is more than twice as large as that of any other nation. We cannot deny that we are the world's only remaining superpower. We cannot escape the reality that our overseas interests are broader and more compelling than those of any other country. Still, within those parameters, we will fight to ensure that the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping is kept to an absolute minimum. To me, for the United States to continue to pay 30.4 percent of the total costs of U.N. peacekeeping does seem excessive.
(The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420.)